In today’s global financial landscape, anti-financial crime teams must identify and understand the complex networks behind money laundering, sanctions evasion and fraud. Insights from external data, or Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) plays a key role in this. Yet time pressures often mean that these teams cannot conduct the thorough investigations needed.
In this case study, we explore how the Videris Automate platform can be used to solve this problem. We recreated a real complex case involving intricate connections between sanctioned individuals, state-linked entities and offshore business structures, which took our own experts days to complete using traditional methods. With Videris Automate, it’s possible to achieve the same findings in minutes, without compromising on security, accuracy or ethics.
The findings underscore the importance of sophisticated analytical tools in balancing regulatory risk management and efficiency.
The challenge of complex networks
Jurisdictions with robust financial infrastructures are particularly vulnerabl e to exploitation by individuals seeking to circumvent sanctions. The complexity of these infrastructures allows bad actors to hide their activity more easily, using techniques such as opaque ownership structures and cross-border asset transfers.
This investigation revealed the extent to which sanctioned individuals and state-linked entities can embed themselves within local financial systems. It centred on a high-net-worth individual (“Subject A”), closely associated with a well-known sanctioned figure (“Subject B”), and their network of business interests spanning multiple jurisdictions.
How complex was the investigation?
As discussed above, this investigation took an experienced investigator several days because of the extensive, complex networks and disparate OSINT sources involved. The activities and intelligence techniques involved included:
- Reviewing local corporate registry and planning application data to confirm family ties and operation in local financial structures.
- Using global corporate records and media to map roles in several major companies, including energy and mining firms, and offshore entities used for high-profile acquisitions. This revealed that Subject A often acted as a financial intermediary, facilitating transactions on behalf of Subject B’s network. It also identified links between Subject A and a local trust company which may have been used for this purpose.
- Analysing business transfer documentation to reveal a pattern of strategic asset transfer to shield owners from imminent sanctions exposure.
- Visualising Subject A’s corporate connectivity, then overlaying with and comparing to data from other open sources to reveal likely hostile state interference in UK-registered companies owned by Subject A.
Ultimately, the investigation revealed significant connections between hostile state actors and a UK resident and bank client.
